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Introduction
The ILO estimated that world unemployment
reached nearly 212 million in 2009, an increase of
34 million since 2007 (ILO 2010). The increase is a
consequence of the worldwide recession that was
triggered by failures in various interlinked credit
markets, including the subprime mortgage bubble in
the US housing market.The increase occurred even
though many governments intervened to maintain
demand, by loosening monetary policy, including
quantitative easing, as well as through cutting taxes
and/or increasing government spending.Consequent
fiscal imbalances are resulting in funding difficulties
for many of these governments. The cost of credit
default swaps, which are used to insure against sov-
ereign debt default, have risen very sharply for gov-
ernments that have no credible plan for reducing
their budget deficits. Thus there is a significant risk
that recovery of world demand will be anaemic,with
further increases in unemployment likely.
Nearly half of the increase in world unemployment
has occurred in OECD countries. From March 2008
until the end of 2009, unemployment in the OECD
increased by 16.5 million. The growth in OECD
unemployment has been dominated by Europe and
the United States, with increases of 7.5 and 7.0 mil-
lion respectively.In 2009,the US unemployment rate
reached 9.2 percent, exceeding that in the European
Union for the first time since comparable figures
were available.
This paper reviews the declines in employment and
increases in unemployment across the OECD both
by country and by groups within countries.The latter
highlights the extent to which the costs of unem-
ployment are distributed unevenly across popula-
tions.We also reflect on the effects of unemployment
on individual well-being.
Employment
Labour is a derived demand and the present reces-
sion has been driven by a collapse in demand for
goods and services. In consequence the demand
for labour has fallen. But there has been no con-
sistent relationship between falls in output and
increases in unemployment across OECD coun-
tries. This is shown in Table 1, where we date the
beginning of the recession from the first quarter of
2008.Not all countries experienced the first reduc-
tion in output during this quarter, but this is the
modal measure of the start of the recession in the
OECD.
What is evident is that there has been huge vari-
ability in the labour market responses to downturns
in demand. Some countries (e.g. Germany, Italy,
Japan) have experienced large falls in output, but
relatively modest decreases in employment. Other
countries (e.g. the United States, Ireland) have
experienced more rapid declines in employment
than in output. A simple regression of the changes
in employment on the change in output from Table
1 yields an estimated slope of 0.43 with a p-value of
0.001 and an R2 of 0.32. Thus, for these OECD
countries over approximately seven quarters of the
current recession, the short-run elasticity of
demand for labour has been relatively low. Clearly,
changes in demand only explain a relatively small
share of the inter-country differences in employ-
ment response.
One possible explanation is labour hoarding,
reflecting the notion of labour as a quasi-fixed fac-
tor. Employers may seek to minimise short-run
costs by reducing the demand for labour at the
intensive margin. Thus, in Japan, though employ-
ment had only fallen by 2.7 percent from 2008 Q1
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to 2009 Q3, aggregate hours of work fell by 6 per-
cent, almost matching the decline in output. The
German government introduced a policy to sub-
sidise short-term working arrangements. It pays
half of employers social security contributions for
the loss of earnings associated with reduced work-
ing hours. In 2008 Q4, 1.6 percent (626,000) of
employees were registered with
this scheme. Further examples
of hours adjustment are shown
in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1
shows the share of part-timers
in total UK employment from
2007 to 2009. There is a rela-
tively sharp increase in the
share of part-timers in total
employment from 2008 Q1,
when the recession started in
Britain. Figure 2 shows average
hours worked by all private
sector employees in the United
States from 2006 to 2010.A rel-
atively sharp decline in average
hours worked is apparent from
early 2008. Productivity per
worker may have declined as a result of labour
hoarding, but productivity per hour may not have
fallen as much, if at all. Nevertheless unit costs will
tend to rise due to the fixed costs of labour.
Reductions in employment have not been uniform-
ly distributed. In the United States, for example,
Table 1 
Changes in output, employment and unemployment in OECD countries 2008 Q1 to 2009 Q3
Percentage change  Number of change (in 1 000)


















































































































– 1 363 
– 136 
– 2 
– 1 131 
– 609 
– 8 115 






































































































































































































































SHARE OF PART TIME EMPLOYMENT IN TOTAL EMPLOYMENT
 UK 2007–2009
Sources: Office of National Statistics.
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the construction and manufacturing sectors have
experienced a very rapid declines in jobs. Between
mid-2008 and January 2010, employment in con-
struction in the United States fell by 21.5 percent,
while employment in manufacturing fell by
13.9 percent. Similarly large declines in construc-
tion employment occurred in countries that had
experienced asset bubbles in either domestic or
commercial property, such as Estonia, Latvia,
Spain and Ireland. Figure 3 shows the extent of the
decline in manufacturing and construction employ-
ment across Europe from 2008
Q1 to 2009 Q3. It illustrates the
great diversity of the demand
shocks as well as differential
labour market responses.
The specific nature of the shocks
results in differential impacts on
particular groups within the
population. One of the most
striking effects has been on the
age structure of employment. In
the EU employment fell by
5.1 percent for those aged
15–24 between 2008 Q1 and
2009 Q3. In the United States
the equivalent decline was
15.4 percent. But for those aged 50+, EU employ-
ment increased by 4 percent, while in the United
States there was a 2.5 percent increase in employ-
ment of those aged 55+ during the period when the
US labour market lost over 7 million jobs.
There are a number of forces that likely underlie this
development. First, older people may be staying in
the labour market longer because falling asset values
associated with the recession have reduced their
expected retirement income. Second, because
employment has increasingly concentrated away
from manufacturing and construction towards the
service sector,the costs of substituting older workers
for the relatively young has likely decreased.
Increased competition from older workers makes it
more difficult for the young to find employment.
Third, young people, anticipating that the labour
market may be difficult, may be switching to attend-
ing college in the hope of improving their prospects.
In Britain applications to attend university increased
by 22 percent between 2009 and 2010,with increases
for those aged 21 to 24 up by 44.8 percent and
63.4 percent for those aged over 25.
A further part of the explanation of differential
growth rates by age group is demographic. Annual
growth rates of those aged 16-24 and 50-64 in the EU
and the United States over the period 2008-2020 are
shown in Figure 4.The number aged 16-24 in the EU
will decline slowly between 2008 and 2010 before
declining much more rapidly thereafter. Never-
theless the decline in employment is much more
rapid than the decline in population over the
2008–2010 period. In contrast, numbers aged 16–24
in the United States are broadly constant. And for
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CHANGES IN MANUFACTURING AND CONSTRUCTION 
EMPLOYMENT
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increase in both Europe and the United States. For
this group, the growth in employment in Europe has
been more rapid than the growth in population over
the 2008–2010 period, though by a smaller margin
than the disparity in the 16–24 age group. It appears
that, for Europe, changes in demography explain a
share of the change in employment.
There have also been marked
changes in employment by edu-
cational status. These are
shown in Table 2, which uses
Eurostat data to track how
changes in employment have
been distributed across In-
ternational Standard Classifi-
cation of Education (ISCED)
qualifications between 2008 Q1
and 2009 Q3.What is evident is
that the recession has reduced
employment among those with
low qualifications than among
those with intermediate or
higher qualifications.In the EU
as a whole, employment among
those with qualifications up to
ISCED Level 2 (lower secondary school) fell by
3.2 million (6.3 percent), while for those with ter-
tiary education, employment levels actually in-
creased by 4.7 percent. The recession appears to
have moved Europe towards forms of production
that are more human capital intensive. The most
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been experienced in countries
that experienced house price
bubbles, notably including Ire-
land, the Baltic States and
Spain. Employment declined
for all levels of education in
countries where there were
very large falls in output. Un-
iquely, Denmark has experi-
enced employment falling
among the better educated, but
rising among those with the lowest level of qualifi-
cations.Thus, while there is a general trend to rel-
ative worsening of employment prospects for
those with low levels of qualifications, there are
wide variations between countries that reflect pat-
terns of demand and the organisation of the
labour market in these countries.
Temporary contracts have become an increasing fea-
ture of employment arrangements in recent years.In
the EU15 the number of workers on temporary con-
tracts increased from 18 million to 21 million
between 2000 Q2 and 2008 Q1,a rise of 16.6 percent.
But between 2008 Q1 and 2009 Q3, numbers
employed on temporary contracts fell by 3.3 percent,
while total employment fell by around 2 percent.
Consistent with the insider-outsider version of
labour market behaviour,being on a temporary con-
tract increased the probability of job loss. But this is
not a general finding across the EU: it is concentrat-
ed specifically in Spain, where more than a million
workers on temporary contracts lost their jobs
between 2008 Q1 and 2009 Q2, almost 2/3rds of the
total job loss.This is generally ascribed to the rigidi-
ty of permanent employment contracts in Spain. In
the rest of the EU15, temporary employment has
actually risen since the onset of the recession. This
may reflect employers changing the nature of
employment contracts to limit their contingent lia-
bilities. It is certainly not consistent with the insider-
outsider version of labour market.
Downward wage flexibility may be another response
to weakness in labour demand. Data on annualised
changes in hourly earnings for some countries where
data is available is shown in Table 3.Growth rates of
earnings have slowed markedly in France, Japan and
Britain, but have increased in Germany. Interesting-
ly, although both are classed as having very flexible
labour markets,wage growth slowed more in Britain
than in the United States. One possible explanation
of this is the British tax credit system, which means
that relatively low paid workers willing to accept
wage cuts face less than the equivalent reduction in
net income. Thus, tax credits play a perhaps unex-
pected role as automatic stabilisers within the British
economy.
Unemployment
The change in unemployment by OECD countries
is shown alongside the absolute change in employ-
ment in column 4 of Table 1.Since the beginning of
the recession, the increase in unemployment in the
OECD as a whole has exceeded the decline in
employment by more than 3 million. But a simple
regression of the change in unemployment on the
change in employment for the 28 countries includ-
ed in Table 1 gives a coefficient of – 0.94,which has
a p-value close to zero but is not significantly dif-
ferent from one. The discrepancy between the
overall change and the regression result is likely
due to differences in the implicit weights in the two
calculations.
The rise in unemployment has been substantial,
especially for the young.Youth unemployment rates
for the under 25s averaged 20.9 percent in January
2010 in the EU as a whole compared with an EU
overall average of 9.9 percent.Youth unemployment
rates are 39.6 percent in Spain and 32.4 percent in
Ireland, compared with 33.1 and 18.5 percent,
respectively a year earlier. Figure 5 shows the ratio
between under-25 and over-25 unemployment rates
by country in 2008 and 2009 which average around
2.5:1. Male unemployment rates are higher than
female rates in most countries but in several the
reverse is the case (Austria, Czech Republic, Spain,
France, Italy, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland
and Slovakia).
The rise has also been unevenly distributed across
countries. Active labour market policies (ALMPs)
Table 3  
Annualised rate of increase in hourly earnings  
in selected developed countries 
2005 Q1 to 2008 Q1 
(%) 
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have been unable to offset the negative labour mar-
ket consequences of a massive drop in product
demand.We discussed the evidence on ALMPs in a
previous paper (Bell and Blanchflower 2000a),
arguing that there is no clear evidence in their
favour. However, in Germany, for example, direct
intervention in the labour market through the use of
subsidies for short-term working has contained the
fall in employment and rise in unemployment to a
greater extent than some countries with ‘flexible’
labour markets, such as the United States. Subsidies
to short-time working have been introduced in
France, Spain, the Netherlands and Italy. Clearly
these raise competition issues as well as questions
over whether their effects can be anything but tem-
porary if national governments have to restore their
fiscal balances.
Countries with a more rapid rise in unemployment
than fall in employment are experiencing rises in
labour supply. This may come from a number of
sources. More young people may be joining the
labour market. Fewer older people may be leaving
the labour market.Fewer people of working age may
be taking a break from the labour market.And final-
ly economically active immigrants may exceed the
number of economically active emigrants.And these
effects need not necessarily be working in the same
direction, since they reflect the incentives that indi-
viduals are confronted with in different parts of the
labour market.
There is evidence that young people in some coun-
tries are seeking to prolong their stay in education
as a way of postponing labour market entry. In
Britain there has been a 23-percent rise in college
applications for 2010–2011. The increase has been
particularly marked among those aged 25 and over.
There has also been a slight decline in the number
of adult overseas nationals seeking national insur-
ance numbers in Britain since late 2007. The UK
government claimed that there has been a 33-per-
cent rise in the number of non-British citizens emi-
grating from this country in the year since March
2008, reducing net immigration to Britain to
147,000. As we have seen, there has also been an
increase in the number of older workers continuing
to seek employment.
So what are the factors that have influenced the
probability of being unemployed, at a European
level before and during the recession? We have
already investigated this in the UK context in a pre-
vious paper (Bell and Blanchflower 2009a). Using
Labour Force Survey data,we showed that the prob-
ability of unemployment increased with age,was typ-
ically higher for non-whites, and was particularly
high for black youths.As implied by our earlier argu-
ment unemployment rates declined with higher lev-
els of education,conditional on other characteristics.
And finally, regional variations in unemployment
within the country, which played a significant politi-
cal role in past recessions, have become much less
significant.
In this paper we extend the analysis to Europe.
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4 show the results of a
dprobit model where the dummy dependent variable
takes the value 1 if the person is unemployed and 0 if
employed.Data are drawn from two Eurobarometer
surveys for the years 2006 and 2009. The results are
broadly consistent with those from Britain. Un-
employment probability declines with age, is higher
from males and for those who left school early. The
change in country coefficients in the individual
regression broadly corresponds with the aggregate
unemployment data. Thus, Spain, Lithuania and
Latvia have experienced the largest increase in their
country coefficients between 2006 and 2009, while




































RATIO OF UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 16–24
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Netherlands and Austria declined relative to
Belgium. All of these countries have short-time
working arrangements in place.
The individual regressions suggest what individual
characteristics have made the greatest difference to
the probability that individuals in Europe have
Table 4 
Life satisfaction and unemployment probability equations 
Unemployment probability  Life satisfaction (OLS) 


























































































































































































































































Notes: Excluded categories: employed, no full-time schooling, Belgium, single, left wing, 35–44 years. Samples in columns
1 and 2 are the workforce (= employed plus unemployed), while samples for columns 3 and 4 are the total population.
ALS = age left school; left, centre and right stand for political affiliation. The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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become unemployed since the recession began.
While the country effects are consistent with our
understanding of the differential national downturns
in demand, the groups of coefficients that have
changed most over the course of the last three years
are those associated with age. Increase in the proba-
bility of unemployment for those aged 15 to 24 has
been much greater than the impact on living in a par-
ticular country, having particular level of education,
or being male or female.
Well-being
Finally we examine the question of whether the
recession has affected well-being.One obvious chan-
nel through which this might take place is unem-
ployment, given that we know that the unemployed
are generally less satisfied with their circumstances
than are those in employment.Thus we ask whether
the substantial deterioration in labour market condi-
tions in different parts of Europe since the onset of
recession affected individual well-being.
We know that unemployment, as well as having a
range of social costs, also tends to reduce well-
being. Social costs are discussed in Bell and
Blanchflower (2009a). These include educational
underachievement, inactivity, crime and health.We
also discuss individual costs such as the scarring
effect of unemployment on younger workers.Thus,
using the National Child Development Study
(NCDS), which follows a group of people born in
Britain during a specific week in March 1958, we
showed that if these individuals experienced unem-
ployment at age 23, then conditional on their other
characteristics, they were unlikely to experience
lower life and job satisfaction, poorer health, earn
lower wages and be more likely to be unemployed
at age 46 than those who did not experience early
unemployment.
We approached this question using recent data from
Eurobarometer. We used these to estimate OLS
regressions for well-being in European countries in
2006 and 2009 – ordered logits gave similar results.
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 4 show our results. Consis-
tent with almost all studies of individual well-being,
we find that unemployment has a negative effect on
happiness, and that this has increased somewhat
since the beginning of the recession. Most other
coefficients take their expected signs,such as gender,
marital status etc.Also those of a right wing political
persuasion have higher well-being than those politi-
cally in the centre or left.
Another interesting feature of these results is the
changes that have taken place in country coefficients
between 2006 and 2009. Conditional on unemploy-
ment and other regressors, the largest declines in
well-being are associated with countries that have
experienced significant difficulties in their goods,
and/or their labour markets as a result of the reces-
sion. Those experiencing the most dramatic decline
in well-being were France, Greece, Hungary, Italy,
Lithuania, Turkey and Spain. Many possible expla-
nations could be consistent with these findings.
Issues of fiscal stability at the national level may
have reduced individual feelings of confidence and
self-worth. In countries where there have been asset
bubbles, individuals may have suffered drops in
average wealth, a factor not captured by the regres-
sions.One exception is Ireland,which interestingly is
the European country that has taken the most deci-
sive action in response to its fiscal crisis.
Conclusions
This paper has examined recent changes in OECD
labour markets. It has established that there have
been a wide variety of responses of employment to
changes in demand and also a wide variety of re-
sponses of unemployment to changes in employ-
ment. Thus some countries have experienced large
falls in output without necessarily much change in
the number of workers employed at the extensive
margin of the labour market. Some countries have
subsidised employment; others have sought to
incentivise adjustment on the extensive margin,
through measures such as subsidies to short-time
work, while others have relied on automatic sta-
bilisers, such as tax credits, to facilitate labour mar-
ket adjustment.Complex adjustments on the supply
side through changes in participation, and in levels
of migration, may explain differences by country in
the response of unemployment to changes in em-
ployment.
We have also investigated the effect of the recession
on individual well-being. Our results confirm the
usual finding that the unemployed feel less satisfied
with their lives than the employed. Thus the overall
increase in unemployment is likely to have resulted
in a reduction in aggregate well-being across OECD
countries. But, conditional on unemployment, weCESifo Forum 1/2010 22
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also find that countries which have experienced
large increases in unemployment, or have suffered
fiscal crises, show additional negative impacts on
well-being. Unemployment hurts.
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